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Abstract
ThispaperformulatesdynamicR&Dinvestmentdecisionsofprivateﬁrms
as an optimal stochastic control problem. It derives explicitly R&D invest-
ment decision rule and the cross equations parameter restrictions imposed
by the rational expectations hypothesis, using the Riccati equations only and
not requiring the use of Wiener-Kolmogorov prediction formula. Identiﬁca-
tion and estimation of the structural parameters are essential for evaluating
policies such as R&D subsidies, ﬁrm size, market concentration so that the
evaluationsof these policies stand against Lucas critique. We ﬁnd conditions
under which the structural parameters are identiﬁed; we then discuss econo-
metric procedures for using aggregate time series data or panel data on ﬁrms
to deal with unobserved technological knowledge, to estimate the structural
parameters, and to test the model.
Keywords: Research and development, rationalexpectations, stochastic
control
￿Main part of this paper was carried out when I wasa Hewlett Postdoctoral Fellow at the NORC,
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1Firm’s R & D Behavior Under Rational Expectations
1 Introduction
It has now been well established that technological change is a major source of
growth. As in the case of physical capital, returns on industrial research and de-
velopment (R&D) investmentsin the private sector will depend upon the evolution
of market conditions and public policies among other factors. Thus the Lucas cri-
tique [1976] on policy evaluationapplies to R&D decisions, namely a ﬁrm’s R&D
investment decisionsunder uncertaintywilldepend uponitsexpectationsabout fu-
ture market conditions and policy changes, and therefore its R&D decision rule
will react to the changes in the stochastic processes of these factors. The point
of the critique is that instead of estimating a R&D decision rule by throwing in
arbitrarily some policy variables as regressors, one should model and estimate the
parameters of the ﬁrm’s objective function and the stochastic processes that con-
stitute the environment in which the ﬁrm operates. To that end, we need tractable
dynamic economic models of R&D investment decisionswhich lend to estimation
and testing using available econometric techniques. Hansen and Sargent [1981]
among others began such a line of research to model aggregate labor supply deci-
sionsovertime ofarepresentativeagent. Wefollowtheirleadtoprovideatractable
model of R&D along the same line.
What makes tractable modeling of R&D investments difﬁcultis that the output
of this activity, technological knowledge, possesses many properties of a com-
modity for which standard economic theory fails. For instance, knowledge is an
intangible,indivisibleandinappropriable(i.e., difﬁculttoinstitutea propertyright)
commodity and exhibits externalities in its production and use. Therefore, unlike
the physical capital, the market prices for knowledge do not exist which could
guide R&D investment decisions(Arrow [1962], Griliches[1979],Nelson [1982]).
The rate of accumulation of technologicalknowledge of a ﬁrm acquired by means
of R&D investments will depend upon the followingfactors:
(1) Firm size, intensityof rivalry or competition(Schumpeter [1934, 1950]).
(2) Complete uncertainty about the proﬁtabilityof a new product, if it is a product
innovation,andpartialuncertaintyabouttheshiftsin demandfor the product
if it is a process innovation(Schmookler [1966]).
(3) R&D capabilities or ”strength of knowledge” for efﬁcient R&D search for
ﬁrms having different ”science bases” (Rosenberg [1976], Nelson [1982],
2Nelson and Winter [1977,1978], Evenson and Kislev [1976]).
(4) Government policies such as R&D tax credits, MRTP (monopoly restrictive
trade practices), licensing schemes, patent laws, investments in basic re-
search affecting (1)-(3).
Theoreticalmodelsof R&D have consideredmostof the above aspectsof tech-
nological knowledge, and studied the effects of government policieson R&D sub-
sidies, market concentration, ﬁrm size (Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1980a&b among
others, see Kamien and Schwartz [1981] for a survey of these papers). The empir-
ical research, on the other hand, has been carried out mainly in two lines ignoring
many of the above aspects of R&D. One set of studies is concerned with testing
the Schumpeterian hypothesis regarding the effects of ﬁrm size and intensity of
rivalry on the pace of R&D investments within a static framework (see Levin and
Reiss [1984], Kamien and Schwartz [1981] for an account of these studies). The
other set of studies is concerned with the effects of R&D expenditures on produc-
tivity growth (Griliches [1984], Mohnen [1992], Mairesse and Sassenou [1991],
Raut [1995] for accounts of these studies for developed and developingcountries).
Although many studies are directed toward policy analysis, these studies do not
formulate R&D investments using a dynamic economic model and then estimate
the model parameters.1
In this paper we present a dynamic economic model of R&D investments that
incorporates the above aspects of technological knowledge. We explicitly model
the process of knowledge creation, as in Griliches [1979], and Pakes and Griliches
[1984]. To impute a value to technological knowledge in each period, we assume
that the timing of an innovation is unknown; however, the higher is the stock of
knowledge, the higher is the probability of its taking place in any period. By ap-
plying techniques from statistical decision theory to this setup, we impute a value
to stock of technological knowledge. We then show that the ﬁrm’s R&D decision
problemcouldberepresentedbyanoptimalstochasticcontrolproblem(see section
2, for details).
Hansen and Sargent [1981]gave up dynamic programming method for solving
their cost-of-adjustment model of labor supply decisions on the grounds that the
matrix Riccati equation did not lead to a closed form solution. They proposed an
alternative method that uses Euler equation, Transversality condition and Wiener-
Kolmogorov prediction formula to compute a close form optimal decision. I show
1Pakes [1984], however, goesa step closer in this direction; instead of deriving the reduced form
solution with cross equations restrictions imposed by rational expectations, he, however, parameter-
izes the reducedform solution for estimation.
3in this paper, however, that when the control variable is one dimensional (which
was the case in their model too) it is possibleto derive a close form solutionsolely
from the matrix Riccati equation, and thus the Wiener- Kolmogorov prediction
formula is not required for this purpose; this is done in section 3.
In section 4, we investigatethe identiﬁcationof the parameters of the objective
function and the stochastic processes of the environment. We show that while the
structural parameters are unidentiﬁed when the environment is represented by a
ﬁrst order auto-regressive process, when the environment is represented by an au-
toregressive process of order two or higher, the system is generally over identiﬁed;
and thus one can estimate all the structural parameters. In section 5, we describe
how the decision rule and the cross equation restrictions change when we include
other exogenous variables in the information set that Granger cause the stochastic
processes representing the environment.
Previous sections are based on the assumption that technological knowledge
is observable. In section 6, we relax this assumption and give a closed form so-
lution based on noisy measurements of technological knowledge. In section 7,
we consider various econometric strategies that could be adopted to estimate the
structural model and use the overidentiﬁed restrictions to test the model. I have
estimated in Raut [1988] an unrestricted reduced form decision rule using panel
data of Indian private ﬁrms. Using data from developed countries, further empiri-
cal research along this line will shed more light about the actual decision making
process of R&D investments of the private ﬁrms.
2 The Basic Model
2.1 Technological Knowledge
There are at least three different ways in which technologicalknowledge has been
conceptualized in the literature. Arrow[1962] deﬁnes technological knowledge as
information about the states of nature. In his framework, investment in R & D is
visualizedas acquiringmore knowledgeaboutthestatesof natureto improve one’s
subjective beliefs about the possibilityof reaping an innovation, based on Baysian
learning mechanism.
Nelson[1982]treatstechnologicalknowledgeas”capabilityforefﬁcientsearch”.
In hismodels, R&D isviewed as search for a given target, say for instance, a prod-
uct innovation or a process innovation. The search could be targeted in different
directions but with stochastic outcomes. R&D investments are related to the num-
4ber of elements that are expected to be drawn for efﬁcient searching before the
desiredoutcomeisachieved. Themain pointof thisnotionoftechnologicalknowl-
edge is that it is the strengthof knowledge that determines how much R&D efforts
are expected to be successful as opposed to Schmookler’s viewpoint [1966] that
the pay-off determines R&D investments. Nelson [1982], and Nelson and Win-
ter[1982] formalized and gave more operational content to this line of reasoning
that originatedin the works of Rosenberg [1976]. Nelson also studiedthe relation-
ship between knowledge and innovation explicating the public good aspect, the
externalities in the production,and to the sources of technologicalknowledge.
Griliches[1979] gave more empirical content to his deﬁnition of technological
knowledge. Griliches [1979,1984] treated the stock of technological knowledge
as one of the factors of production analogous to stock of physical capital. Like
capitalstock, it depreciatesand becomes obsoleteover time, butcan replenishover
time with R&D investments. He used a production function framework to study
the contributionof R&D on productivitygrowthat the ﬁrm level for U.S. ﬁrms. To
model the spill-over effect empirically, he introduced the notion of technological
distance between two ﬁrms.
My deﬁnitionof technologicalknowledge draws from all three notions. I view
accumulationof technologicalknowledgeasacquisitionofmore informationabout
the states of nature–information about product improvements or process improve-
ments;Ialsoviewitasadeliberateeconomicactivitysimilartoinvestmentinphys-
ical capital. A set of R&D inputs adds to the stock of knowledge which might be
immediately used or might be useful for further information production. However,
unlikein the case of investmentin physicalcapital, I assume here that the marginal
rate, b, at which a unit of R&D adds to the stock of knowledge varies from indus-
try to industry depending on the R&D capability or strength of knowledge or the
science base of that industry. There are various sources for spill-over effects, e.g.,
government’s investment in basic research, (which brings technological change to
theprocessoftechnologicalchange,sotospeak),technologicalknowledgeofother
domestic or foreign ﬁrms, the strength of which depends on the patent law. I as-































t = our ﬁrm’s stock of knowledge at the beginningof period
t
R





￿ = depreciation rate for knowledge
b = technologicalcapability or a measure of strengthof knowledge
c
￿ = a constant measuring the spill-over effect
w
￿
t = random shock in period
t.
The speciﬁcation (1) of the technologyof technologicalknowledgeproduction
is general enough to incorporate various empirical ﬁndings on differential lagged
effects of R&D investments on stock of knowledge.
2.2 Valuation of technological Knowledge
Technologicalknowledgeis an intangible,indivisible,inappropriable,i.e., difﬁcult
to institute a property right, and involves externalities in production and its use.
Patent law is a legal protection assuring only a partial appropriation. There do not
exist markets for technologicalknowledge (Arrow [1962]). Followingthe strategy
of valuation of information in statistical decision theory, we impute an indirect
private value to a stock of technologicalknowledge in the followingway.
The timing of innovation our ﬁrm is pursuing is not known, but the likelihood
of its taking place in any period is higher, the greater is the stock of accumulated





t) be the probability that the








  are plausible. One would like it
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The value of an innovation at t will depend in a number of ways on the ﬁrm size,
z
￿
t, intensity of rivalry,
z
￿
t, and the market condition, or the proﬁtability from the
currentlineofresearch,
 
t. Market concentrationor intensityofrivalryisindeedan
industry level attribute. More rivals in an industry may entail a higher chance for
imitation of an innovated product or process and also a higher chance for another
ﬁrm’s innovation to arrive before the current innovation has reaped its maximum
monopoly rent. Moreover, more rivals may reduce the market share of a ﬁrm. All
6these lead to lower value for an innovation.2
The effect of ﬁrm size on the value of technological knowledge may come
through different channels. Following Nelson’s [1959] interpretation, I argue that
the larger ﬁrms, on the one hand, having already established name and reputation
in the market, can appropriate the beneﬁt of an innovation by easy market pene-
tration, and on the other hand, having more product diversiﬁcation, could use the
accumulated knowledge in more than one line of business. Therefore, the larger
ﬁrms may envisage a bigger return from a given stock of technologicalknowledge
than the smaller ones.3
Anotherimportantfactor in the determinationof valueof technologicalknowl-
edge is completelyunknowndemand for new products in the case of product inno-
vation and shift in the demand in the case of process innovation. Higher are these
uncertainties,thelowerwillbethevalueoftechnologicalknowledge. Thisissome-
times referred as Schmookler’s hypothesis or demand pull or market opportunity
hypothesis.
Taking into account all the above factors in valuation of knowledge, let us














For simplicity I am assuming here that (4) gives the present value at time t of the
stream of cash-ﬂows that the innovation will bring, and it depends only on the
market condition prevailing at that time, but not on the future market conditions.
For instance, this will be the case if the innovation is patented and sold to another




t is the R&D inputused in period t, and if we assume that the cost of R&D
is quadratic in input use, one period expected reward from a stock of knowledge,
z
￿













































2Also greater monopoly power reduces the incentive for innovation as the ﬁrm with monopoly
power cancontinueto earnthe monopolyrent without venturing into anew technologicalinnovation.
It is generally argued that an intermediate level of market concentration is most conducive to rapid
technological innovation.
3It should, however, be noted that the smaller ﬁrms are not necessarily restricted to use their
knowledgeonlyin their ownproduction units asthey can alwayssell it to anotherﬁrm with licensing
arrangements.
4Kamien and Schwartz [1981], explicitly modeledrivalry usinga subjective hazardfunction, and
then derived a functional relationship between rivalry and the present value of an innovation.





￿ as given by (1). If we further
assume thatafter reapingthetargeted innovation,ourﬁrm willventure intoanother
innovation that will use the knowledge of the previous pursuit, then the ﬁrm faces















g, that characterize the environment facing our ﬁrm,























































  denotes the conditional expectation of
x given information set
 

















































 . Substituting(3) in (7) and disregarding all terms























































































































































































































































































  isa three dimensionalvectorof whitenoiseprocess. Writing






















































































































t to be a 4-dimensional white noise process.
I am assuming here for simplicity that R&D activities affect neither the ﬁrm
size nor the intensity of rivalry. While this assumption is innocuous in the short-
run, 6 but for a medium to long-run analysis this may not be the case, see for
instance, Landes [1969] for historical evidence.
2.3 Firm’s problem
We assume that manager of our ﬁrm knows the parameters of his objective func-
tion, (6), and the parameters of the stochastic processes (10). At the beginning of
each period,






















he chooses a R&D investment
R
t so as to maximize (6) subject to (10).





























































In our particular case,
q and
h are zero vectors. Solution of (11) gives the optimal
R
t as a functionof
 
t. We ﬁnd solutionin the next section.
3 Closed form solution to ﬁrm’s optimization problem
For now we assume that stock of knowledge is observable. We will relax this












Following Bertsekas [1976], and Chow [1975,1981], we show that under certain
conditions7 on A, B, c, Q, and H, there exists an optimalstationarysolutionto (11)
as stated in the followingproposition:
6However, see Levin [1981], and Levin and Reiss [1984] for studies of the simultaneity of R&D
expenditures and market concentration in a static framework.
7such as controllability and observability, see Bertesekas [1976] for details





















































































































































Proof: We guess a solutionfor

















K is a positive deﬁnite matrix,
k is vector of positive numbers and
  is
a non-negative real number.
































































































































we substitute the optimal value of
R
















t and the constant term, we get (15) and (16)
respectively.
10Q.E.D







g. To ﬁnd the closeform optimal
















































































































































































































































































































































































Substitutingthese in the right hand side of the last equalityof (20) and then equat-











































































































 . Substituting these in (19) and simplifying the expression
(14) in a similar fashion, we have the following close form decision rule, (24)
which is stated as a proposition.







































































































































Equation(24) together with the system of equationsfor motion of the environ-
ment, (10), constitutethe ﬁrm’s decisionrule. The assumptionof rational expecta-
tions and a particular speciﬁcationof the stochasticprocesses, (10) have generated
cross equations parameter restrictions in the decision function of the ﬁrm. These
restrictions are generally used for identiﬁcation of the structural parameters and
also for testing the rational expectations hypothesis assuming the model (10) is
correct or for testing the speciﬁcation of the model (10) assuming the rational ex-
pectations hypothesis is correct. We will take up the identiﬁcation issues in the
next section and estimation and testing issues in a later section.
124 Identiﬁcation of parameters: need for more lags




















































t isobservable. Therefore, thesecondsetofcoefﬁcients
could be estimated from the system of equations(10). However, we willshow that
not all of the ﬁrst set of parameters could be identiﬁed, and hence they could not


































































Note that from (25) we can get an estimate of




from (28) in (26) and then substitutingthe value of
k
￿
















From (29) we can get an estimate of
 . But since
  cancelled out, we cannot
identify it in this system. Therefore, the system (10) - (24) is under identiﬁed.
4.1 Higher Order Lags and Identiﬁcation Problem
We would investigate here whether speciﬁcation of a higher order auto-regressive
process for (10) may ameliorate the under identiﬁcation problem. We show that
the parameters could indeed be identiﬁed. While for any general auto-regressive
processesin (10), the closedform solutioncouldeasilybe derived, for expositional























































































































































To derive the closeform solutionfor the speciﬁcation(30), we expandthe state
space
Z
t to contain all the lag values of z’s and then extend the deﬁnition of A, Q,
B and
c appropriatelyand proceed exactly thesame way as we derived the solution




t follows a third order autoregressive process, and assume that there






t both of which follow ﬁrst order au-
toregressive process as in the previous model. The form of the close form solution
when all state variables except
z
￿
t follows third order autoregressive process will
be transparent from the derivation of this special case. In our sketch, we basically
note the differences withour earlier derivation. First of all, note thatour new
Z
t,A,


























































































































































































































































The above is parallel of equation (19). It is clear from the above that we need
to compute only the ﬁrst row of the Riccati matrix K. To that end, proceeding
as in equations, (20) and ((21) of the previous model, we have the following ﬁve
































































































































































































































































It is now clear how to derive these formulae for the general case. We state the
general result in the followingproposition:







































































































































































































































￿ are as deﬁned in (24) of proposition3.2.
15Hansen and Sargent [1981] gave similar close form solution using Wiener -
Kolmogorov prediction formula. However, in our case (41) and (42) have been
derived directly from the matrix Riccati equation of the problem.
























From equation (43), we can estimate
 . It is now clear that given
 , we can
estimate
  from (26)-(29). (Note that (26)-(29) are valid in this case also).













￿ from the equations that parallel (39), we can get an estimate of
 .
Now from (39) we get
q
￿












￿. Finally, from (28) we get
q
￿
￿. So, all the structural parameters
could be recovered in this case. Note that we have never used parallel of (38) and





t in our identiﬁcation strategy.
Therefore, the rational expectations hypothesis has imposed over identifying
restrictions across equations.
5 Granger causality and choice of variables in
￿
t














and their lag values. In fact, we should include in
 












t. In this section, we consider the nature of
the close form solution and the cross equations restrictions that will be generated
by the rational expectations hypothesis in such a case. For expositional ease, we









us assume that we have an extra stochastic process
X
￿




and which is related to
Z
￿































































































































t and its lag, appropriately modifying the matrices, A, B, C and
























































































































































































































































The identiﬁcation of structural parameters in this case follows the same steps
as in the previous model. Notice that the above could be generalized for higher
order auto-regressive processes and for other z-variables easily.
6 Unobserved Technological Knowledge
So far we have assumed that
Z
￿
t is observable. We relax this assumptionnow. We




















 . It is well known in the control theory that the same closed







t in (24) (41) and (45). However, the



















 . Oneapproach, used
in the optimal control literature, is based on the Kalman-ﬁltering formula (see
Chow [1981] for an exposition of Kalman ﬁltering). While this is an appropri-
ate approach, it assumes that initialstockof knowledgeis known,which is rather a
strong assumptionif we use panel data of ﬁrms. Even when we could obtain some
noisy estimate of the initialstock of technologicalknowledge, Kalman ﬁltering al-
gorithm when combined with an algorithm of maximum likelihood estimation of
the structural parameters become highly non-linear and may not converge in most
cases.
An alternative approach followed by Griliches [1979] and Pakes and Griliches
[1984] is to take changes in stock of knowledge at t as weighted sum of past ﬁve
years’ R & D investments and then relate it to the number of patents applied for
by the ﬁrm in any period. Although, their purpose was not the estimation of stock
of knowledge, their method could be adopted to generate an empirical measure
of knowledge up to a scale factor. Actually, from their productivity analysis, one
could get a direct estimate of the weights for different lags of R&D expenditures
andhenceameasureofknowledgewithmeasurementerrors(seeGriliches[1979]).













  is a vector of regression coefﬁcients and
X
t include past R & D expendi-
tures, and other technologicalvariables such as royaltyand technical fee payments
















t is not observed, what we observe is
P
t the total number
of patents our ﬁrm has applied for up to period



























































F is the distributionof
































These models are known as ordered qualitative response models (see Amemiya
[1985] and Maddala [1983] for more about these models).
We can use Logit or Probit speciﬁcation to estimate (48), however,
  in (48)




187 Estimation and testing of the model
We illustrate estimation and testing problems for the rational expectations model
giving rise to the system (30) and (41). It should be noted that by adding X-
processes to the system (30) wouldnot change the nature of the econometric prob-
lems, so we omit those for our expositionalease. (41) is not yet a regression equa-




t is a random process which is observed by the producer but not






t follows a ﬁrst






































































































sionssimilarto (49). Treating estimated
Z
￿
t as observed technologicalknowledge,
one can nowuse the methodof maximum likelihoodtoestimate allthe parameters.
Assuming that the model (30) is true for the
Z
t- processes, the cross equation
parameter restrictionscould be used to test the hypothesisof rational expectations.
Let
L














plugging in the values of
  in (41). There are now 6 parameters to be estimated.






















9-6 = numberof restrictionsunder the hypothesisthatthe crossequationparameter
restrictions are true.
In fact, the same test could also be used for testing the speciﬁcations of the
model (30), under the assumption that the rational expectationshypothesisis true.
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